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—  Sympos ium — 
Marijuana, Federal Power and 
the States 
Introduction 
Jonathan H. Adler† 
In November 2012, Colorado and Washington State withdrew 
from the battle against marijuana. Voters in each state approved 
ballot initiatives legalizing possession of marijuana and authorizing 
state regulation of marijuana production and commercial sale.1 In 
2014, Alaska, Oregon, and the District of Columbia followed suit.2 
Another twenty states have legalized marijuana possession for 
medicinal purposes.3 Additional ballot initiatives to decriminalize or 
legalize marijuana, whether strictly for medical uses or generally, can 
be expected in the years to come.4 At least where marijuana is 
concerned, states are opting out of the “war on drugs.”5  
†  Johan Verheij Memorial Professor of Law and Director of the Center for 
Business Law & Regulation, Case Western Reserve University School of 
Law. The author would like to thank the late Peter B. Lewis for his 
support of the symposium “Marijuana, Federal Power & the States,” at 
the Case Western Reserve University School of Law, September 11, 
2014. The author would also like to thank Graham Boyd for his 
assistance with the program and Joseph Sabo for his research assistance. 
1. See Colo. Const. amend. 64; Washington Initiative 502, No. 63-502, 
Reg. Sess. (Nov. 6, 2012). 
2. See John Hudak & Philip A. Wallach, 2014 “Marijuana Midterms” to 
Establish 2016 as Most Crucial Year for Cannabis in America, FixGov, 
Oct. 28, 2014, http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/fixgov/posts/2014/10/ 
28-2014-midterms-marijuana-midterms-oregon-alaska-washington-hudak-
wallach. 
3. See Steven B. Duke, The Future of Marijuana in the United States, 91 
Or. L. Rev. 1301, 1302 (2013); see also NORML, “State Laws,” 
http://norml.org/laws. 
4. See, e.g., Niraj Chokshi, First Marijuana Legalization Ballot Measure 
Set for 2016, Advocates Say, Wash. Post (Mar. 14, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2015/03/14/ 
first-marijuana-legalization-ballot-measure-set-for-2016-advocates-say/ 
(discussing 2016 ballot initiative in Nevada); Alan Johnson, Group Aims 
for 2015 Ballot Issue to Legalize Marijuana, Columbus Dispatch (Dec. 
19, 2014) http://www.dispatch.com/content/stories/local/2014/12/18/ 
Marijuana_ballot_issue_possible_in_2015.html (discussing potential 
Ohio ballot initiative). 
5. Ernest A. Young, Modern-Day Nullification: Marijuana and the 
Persistence of Federalism in an Age of Overlapping Regulatory 
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The use, possession, cultivation, and sale of marijuana remains 
illegal under federal law. Marijuana is listed in Schedule I of the 
Controlled Substances Act (CSA), where it was placed by Congress in 
1970.6 Cultivation and distribution of marijuana are felonies, and CSA 
violations may authorize asset seizure.7 While the federal government 
has not prioritized enforcement of marijuana prohibition in states that 
have decriminalized or sought to legalize marijuana possession, it has 
not sought to preempt state initiatives either, including those that 
affirmatively license and regulate a growing marijuana industry. 
Those who use marijuana or participate in marijuana-related busi-
nesses remain in potential legal jeopardy, and the viability of state-
level reforms remains unclear.8 Banks and financial institutions, in 
particular, face tremendous legal uncertainty about the extent to 
which they may provide services to marijuana-related businesses.9 
The constitutional authority of the federal government to prohibit 
the possession and distribution marijuana was affirmed by the Su-
preme Court,10 but the ability of the federal government to enforce 
this policy on the ground is largely dependent upon state coopera-
tion.11 State and local law enforcement agencies are responsible for the  
Jurisdiction, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 769 (2015) (characterizing state 
resistance as a modern form of “nullification”). 
6. See David Firestone, Let States Decide on Marijuana, N.Y. Times, July 
26, 2014; see also Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 
21 U.S.C. §§ 801–889 (2006)). 
7. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 841 (explaining prison terms for marijuana 
cultivation); § 881(a)(7) (explaining that property “used, or intended to 
be used, in any manner or part” to violate the CSA may be subject to 
forfeiture). 
8. See Steven B. Duke, The Future of Marijuana in the United States, 91 
Or. L. Rev. 1301, 1302 (2013) (“Unless reform occurs at the federal 
level . . . state-level reforms face a myriad of limitations and 
uncertainties.”). 
9. See Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev 597 (2015). 
10. See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). For a critique of this ruling, 
see William Baude, State Regulation and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 513 (2015); see also Jonathan H. 
Adler, Is Morrison Dead? Assessing a Supreme Drug (Law) Overdose, 9 
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 751 (2005).  
11. See Alex Kreit, Beyond the Prohibition Debate: Thoughts on Federal 
Drug Laws in an Age of State Reforms, 13 Chapman L. Rev. 555, 561 
(2010) (“Whether or not legalizing or decriminalizing marijuana is a 
good idea, the federal government simply does not have the power to 
effect such change.”); Mark A.R. Kleiman, Cooperative Enforcement 
Agreements and Policy Waivers: New Options for Federal 
Accommodation to State-Level Cannabis Legalization, 6 J. Drug Pol’y 
Analysis 1, 1 (2013) (“[M]arijuana remains illegal under federal law, 
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lion’s share of marijuana law enforcement. The federal government 
cannot take their place. There are approximately four times as many 
state and local law enforcement officers within the states of Wash-
ington and Colorado as there are Drug Enforcement Administration 
agents across the globe.12 Nor can Congress or the executive branch 
compel state cooperation.13 If state and local governments do not 
cooperate, the federal government must wage its war on drugs with-
out many foot soldiers. 
As an increasing number of states have reformed their marijuana 
laws, the federal government has largely stood by, neither seeking to 
obstruct or encourage these efforts. In a series of memoranda, the 
Department of Justice has sought to clarify federal enforcement 
priorities in states that have legalized some or all marijuana possess-
ion. In 2009, Deputy Attorney General David Ogden issued a 
memorandum indicating that the Justice Department would focus its 
enforcement efforts on the production and distribution of marijuana, 
in an effort to curb trafficking, but would not devote significant 
resources to pursue those who used or possessed marijuana in compli-
ance with state laws allowing the use and possession of marijuana for 
medicinal purposes.14 A follow-up memorandum issued by Ogden’s 
successor, James Cole, reaffirmed that while the Justice Department 
was clarifying its enforcement priorities, the possession, cultivation, 
and distribution of marijuana remained illegal under federal law.15 
After Colorado and Washington voters passed their respective 
marijuana legalization initiatives, the Justice Department maintained 
this position. In August 2013, Deputy AG Cole announced that the 
Department would make no effort to block the implementation of ei-
ther initiative, nor was it the federal government’s position that state-
 
but the federal government lacks the capacity to fully enforce that law 
without state and local cooperation.”). 
12. See Mark Kleiman, How Not to Make a Hash Out of Cannabis Legaliza-
tion, Wash. Monthly (Apr./May 2014). 
13. See Printz v. Untied States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the 
federal government may not “commandeer” state and local governments 
to implement or enforce federal law); New York v. United States, 505 
U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the federal government may not force a 
state to legislate in accordance with federal policy). 
14. See Memorandum from David W. Ogden, Deputy Att’y Gen., to U.S. 
Att’ys (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ 
opa/legacy/2009/10/19/medical-marijuana.pdf. 
15. Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General, Guidance 
Regarding the Ogden Memo in Jurisdictions Seeking to Authorize 
Marijuana for Medical Use, June 29, 2011, http://www.justice.gov/oip/ 
docs/dag-guidance-2011-for-medical-marijuana-use.pdf. 
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level regulations of marijuana were preempted by the CSA.16 Accord-
ing to this memorandum, it was the Justice Department’s view that 
the cultivation, distribution, sale, and possession of marijuana in com-
pliance with state laws was “less likely to threaten” federal priorities, 
such as curbing interstate trafficking and preventing youth access. So 
long as this assumption holds, the second Cole memorandum ex-
plained, “enforcement of state law by state and local law enforcement 
and regulatory bodies should remain the primary means of addressing 
marijuana-related activity.”17 
It is not often that states affirmatively seek to legalize conduct 
prohibited by federal law. Rarer still do states seek to expressly 
authorize and affirmatively regulate commercial activities that remain 
subject to federal prohibition.18 Yet that is precisely what is occurring 
with marijuana. Indeed, what the federal government seeks to pro-
hibit, many states hope to tax.19 
The insistence of multiple states on experimenting with various 
levels of marijuana decriminalization or legalization raises a host of 
important and difficult legal questions.20 To explore these questions, 
and the emerging landscape of marijuana law and policy, the Center 
for Business Law & Regulation at the Case Western Reserve Univers-
ity School of Law hosted an interdisciplinary conference on “Mari-
juana, Federal Power & the States” in September 2014. The papers 
from this conference are contained in this issue and address a range of 
constitutional, regulatory, and policy issues raised by the conflict 
between federal marijuana prohibition and recent state-level 
marijuana reforms. The focus of these papers is not whether mari-
juana should or should not be legal, whether for medical or 
recreational purposes. Rather, these papers focus on the legal and  
 
16. See Memorandum for All U.S. Atorneys from James M. Cole, Dep. 
Att’y Gen., Guidance Regarding Marijuana Enforcement, Aug. 29, 2013, 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf. 
17. Id. 
18. In this regard, marijuana may be “unique.” See Sam Kamin, Coopera-
tive Federalism and State Marijuana Regulation, 85 U. Colo. L. Rev. 
1105, 1105 (2014) (“Marijuana is the only substance, and its 
possession is the only activity, that is prohibited at the federal level 
while it is being taxed and regulated in the states. This legal status is 
unique not just at this moment, but also historically.”). 
19. See Kleiman, supra note 11, at 2. 
20. See Kreit, supra note 11, at 555–56 (“[W]hen it comes to federal drug 
law, traditional debates about prohibition, legalization, or decriminal-
ization turn out to be surprisingly unimportant. Instead, as states begin 
to enact new policies the key question facing federal lawmakers and 
administration officials will be how to harmonize federal law with state 
reforms.”). 
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policy questions raised by the fact that federal and state marijuana 
laws conflict. 
Questions about the proper balance between the federal and state 
government have endured since the nation’s founding. Marijuana 
policy is just the latest battleground in this longstanding conflict. It is 
also an issue that could cut across traditional right–left political lines. 
Drug policy reform is often seen as a “liberal” issue. Conservatives 
are expected to be “tough on crime, and voters who support mari-
juana legalization are more likely to support Democratic political can-
didates. Yet many Democrats continue to oppose changes to mari-
juana laws,21 and it is those on the political right who are more likely 
to call for allowing states to deviate from one-size-fits-all federal poli-
cies and serve as “laboratories of democracy.”22 On everything from 
environmental regulation to education policy, Republican officeholders 
argue that individual states should be able to adopt their own policy 
priorities, free from federal interference.  
Does conservative support for a greater policy decentralization 
mean conservatives may support state marijuana policy initiatives? 
Perhaps. Republican support for legislation that would give states 
greater leeway to pursue their own marijuana policies appears to be 
growing, even if most of the support for such measures (and legaliz-
ation generally) comes from the Democratic side of the aisle. In May 
2014, the House of Representatives passed a measure barring the 
Department of Justice or Drug Enforcement Administration from 
spending federal monies on efforts to prevent states from implement-
ing state laws that allow for medical marijuana.23 The measure was 
sponsored by Representative Dana Rohrbacher, (R-CA) and sup-
ported by another forty-eight Republicans. The prior time such a 
measure had been proposed, not even thirty House Republicans would 
support it. 
 
21. Democratic National Committee Chair Debbie Wasserman Shultz, for 
instance, opposed Florida’s medical marijuana initiative. See Marc 
Caputo, Behind Wasserman Schultz’s Marijuana Feud, Politico, Feb. 
24, 2015, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/behind-wasserman-
schultzs-marijuana-feud-115442.html. 
22. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, 
J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system, 
that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a 
laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk 
to the rest of the country.”). 
23. Contrary to some news reports, this measure did not prevent the en-
forcement of federal laws against marijuana possession in such states. 
Rather, it only barred federal efforts to preempt or obstruct state mea-
sures. See Willam E. Moschella, Clearing the Haze: Rohrbacher 
Amendment Does Not Change Federal Policy Regarding Medical 
Marijuana, www.jdsupra.com, June 5, 2014, http://www.jdsupra.com 
/legalnews/clearing-the-haze-rohrabacher-amendment-73362/. 
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As Republicans gear up for the 2016 presidential election, several 
potential candidates have voiced support for state prerogative. 
Senator Ted Cruz (R-TX) and former Texas Governor Rick Perry—
two prominent conservatives—have both stated that states should be 
able to set their own marijuana policies even though each has also 
said that he personally opposes legalization.24 Speaking of the Colo-
rado ballot initiative to the Conservative Political Action Conference 
in 2015, Senator Cruz explained, “If the citizens of Colorado decide 
they want to go down that road, that’s their prerogative. I personally 
don’t agree with it, but that’s their right.”25  
Other prominent Republicans, such as former Florida Governor 
Jeb Bush, have also expressed a willingness to consider letting each 
state go its own way, particularly so long as activities in one state are 
not allowed to have significant effects upon its neighbors.26 While 
running for Vice President in 2012, Representative Paul Ryan (R-
Wis.) also expressed support for letting states decide whether to 
legalize medical marijuana—at least temporarily. He told a Colorado 
television station that he believed Washington should “let the states 
decide what they want to do with these things.”27 Within days, 
however, the campaign claimed that Ryan supported Mitt Romney’s 
position and opposed any legalization of marijuana.28 
The Romney campaign’s hostility to any discussion of marijuana 
policy reform is understandable given the longstanding conservative 
hostility to drug policy reform.29 In some cases, conservative commen-
tators have suggested that state-level reform efforts could be chal-
 
24. See Will Weissert, Perry Defends States’ Right to Legalize Marijuana, 
Associated Press, Jan. 23, 2014, available at WestLaw, 1/23/14 AP 
St. News 22:15:10; Matt Ferner, Ted Cruz Voices Support for States’ 
Right to Legalize Marijuana, Huffington Post (Feb. 26, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/26/ted-cruz-marijuana_n_ 
6764430.html. 
25. Ferner, supra note 24. 
26. Marc Caputo, Jeb Bush Conflicted over Feds Role in Medical-Marijuana 
Enforcement, Miami Herald (Aug. 15, 2014), available at 770 2014 
WLNR 22490198. 
27. Paul Ryan on Medical Marijuana Legalization: “Let the States Decide”, 
Huffington Post (Sept. 7, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com 
/2012/09/07/paul-ryan-marijuana-legalization_n_1866180.html. 
28. Stephen C. Webster, Paul Ryan’s Campaign Immediately Retracts 
Candidate’s Support for Medical Marijuana, The Raw Story (Sept. 
10, 2012), http://www.rawstory.com/rs/2012/09/paul-ryan-immediately-
retracts-support-for-medical-marijuana/. 
29. This hostility was exemplified by the Reagan Administration’s “Just 
Say No” campaign. 
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lenged on federalism grounds.30 If nothing else, federalism limits on 
state power may complicate state regulatory efforts.31 
In December 2014, the states of Nebraska and Oklahoma both 
filed suit seeking to force the preemption of Colorado’s Amendment 
64. Both of these states have been active champions of state preroga-
tives, regularly challenging federal regulatory initiatives in other pol-
icy areas. Here, however, the two states sought federal support sup-
pressing Colorado’s experiment with marijuana, arguing that Colo-
rado’s decision to allow a legal market in marijuana threatened to 
impose a nuisance on neighboring jurisdictions.32 Colorado’s experi-
ence to date, however, suggests that state governments are capable of 
effectively regulating intrastate marijuana markets.33 
Some of the more difficult legal questions confronting state efforts 
to legalize marijuana involve the intersection between state law and 
the existing federal prohibition. Even if the federal government 
decides to scale back marijuana law enforcement in nonprohibition 
states, federal law remains federal law, and it continues to have an 
effect. Banks, attorneys, and others are bound to respect federal law 
even in the absence of conforming state laws, as the legalization of a 
product at the state level does not eliminate the federal prohibition.34 
Legalizing the possession and use of marijuana by adults poses the 
risk that marijuana will become more accessible to juveniles.35 Just as 
some states may disagree with federal prohibition, some localities may 
disagree with their states’ marijuana policy decisions, raising the 
question of whether marijuana federalism should become marijuana 
localism.36   
30. See David B. Rivkin Jr. & Elizabeth Price Foley, Federal Antidrug Law 
Goes Up in Smoke, Wall St. J., Dec. 28, 2014, http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/david-b-rivkin-jr-and-elizabeth-price-foley-federal-antidrug-law-
goes-up-in-smoke-1419810742. 
31. See Brannon P. Denning, Vertical Federalism, Horizontal Federalism, 
and Legal Obstacles to State Marijuana Legalization Efforts, 65 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 567 (2015). 
32. See Jonathan H. Adler, Are Nebraska and Oklahoma Just Fair-Weather 
Federalists? The Volokh Conspiracy (Dec. 19, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/ 
19/are-nebraska-and-oklahoma-just-fair-weather-federalists/. 
33. John Hudak, Colorado’s Rollout of Legal Marijuana Is Succeeding: A 
Report on the State’s Implementation of Legalization, 65 Case W. Res. 
L. Rev. 649 (2015). 
34. Hill, supra note 9. 
35. Steven Davenport, Jonathan P. Caulkins & Mark A.R. Kleiman, 
Controlling Underage Access to Legal Cannabis, 65 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 541 (2015). 
36. Robert A. Mikos, Marijuana Localism, 65 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 719 
(2015). 
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The federal government has a legitimate interest in controlling 
interstate drug trafficking but no particular interest in prosecuting 
those who seek to provide medical marijuana to local residents pursu-
ant to state law. So it only makes sense for the Justice Department to 
tell federal prosecutors to focus their efforts on those who are not in 
compliance with state law, such as those who use medical marijuana 
distribution as a cover for other illegal activities, interstate drug traf-
ficking in particular. California should be free to set its own mari-
juana policy, but the federal government retains an interest in pre-
venting California’s choice from adversely affecting neighboring states. 
One possibility is for the federal government to treat marijuana 
like alcohol, retaining a federal role in controlling illegal interstate 
trafficking but leaving each state entirely free to set its own 
marijuana policy, whether it be prohibition, decriminalization, or 
somewhere in between.37 Another alternative would be for the federal 
government to offer states waivers or enter into cooperative agree-
ments with states that seek to adopt alternative approaches to mari-
juana policy.38 
When alcohol prohibition was repealed, states retained the ability 
to prohibit or regulate alcohol and the federal government focused on 
supporting state-level preferences by prohibiting interstate shipment 
of alcohol in violation of applicable state laws. There is no clear 
reason why a similar approach to marijuana would be less effective, 
though any such step would require legislative reform.39 
Whatever approach the federal government takes in the years 
ahead, the marijuana policy debate today extends well beyond 
whether to legalize cannabis for some or all purposes. Several states 
have taken definitive states to remove legal prohibitions from mari-
juana use, cultivation, and sale, and more are likely to follow suit in 
the years ahead. Unless the federal government were to follow suit, 
the question today is how to address the inevitable interjurisdictional 
conflicts and legal quandaries that will arise. The articles in this issue 
are part of an effort to start this conversation—a conversation that 
will be necessary if these conflicts are to be resolved in a productive 
way.  
This is our federalism on drugs, and it’s going to be an interesting 
trip. 
 
 
37. For an argument that this should be the approach to all illicit drugs, see 
Daniel K. Benjamin & Roger Leroy Miller, Undoing Drugs: 
Beyond Legalization (1993). 
38. Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like, 65 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 689 (2015). 
39. See Firestone, supra note 6. 
